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KEY FINDINGS 
 
At most, 43% of the $524.2 billion 
spent on health care by individuals 
with ESI in 2011 was spent on shop-
pable services. 
 
About 15% of total spending in 
2011 was spent by consumers out-
of-pocket. 
 
$37.7 billion (7% of total spending) 
of the out-of-pocket spending in 
2011 was on shoppable services. 
 
Overall, the potential gains from 
the consumer price shopping as-
pect of price transparency efforts 
are modest.  
Spending on Shoppable  
Services in Health Care 
In the United States, the price of health 
care services is often not known to pa-
tients prior to receiving care. This is 
generally true regardless of whether 
the patient is covered by health insur-
ance. Over the last several years a 
movement to introduce price transpar-
ency—information about the price be-
fore the service is rendered—has 
emerged.  
As consumers are asked to pay more 
for health care services, understanding 
and anticipating those costs may be 
increasingly important to them. At the 
same time, consumers must be able to 
consume value through shopping, by 
choosing lower-priced high-quality pro-
viders. Insurers, employers, and gov-
ernments also have an interest in great-
er price transparency as they hope it 
will lead to lower spending on health 
care. In general, two main arguments 
have been advanced for how price 
transparency may lower spending on 
health care.1 First, consumers will be 
able to know the full cost of services 
before receiving them, and will be able 
to choose lower-cost services or provid-
ers, while holding quality constant. Sec-
ond, when pricing information is public-
ly available, health care providers will 
be incentivized to lower their prices to 
be more competitive (for more infor-
mation about the difficulties with this, 
see CBO 20082). This issue brief focuses 
on the first of these: the potential for 
consumer activity to lower overall 
health care spending. 
One study has estimated that price 
transparency efforts could save $100 
billion dollars over a decade.3 Of this 
amount, $18 billion could come from 
greater consumer access to pricing in-
formation. In theory, consumers would 
use pricing information to comparison 
shop for their health care services and 
providers. However, not all health care 
services are shoppable. It should not be 
expected that someone pull out his or 
her Smartphone and research the low-
est price emergency room before dial-
ing 911. For a health care service to be 
“shoppable,” it must be a common 
health care service that can be re-
searched (“shopped”) in advance; mul-
tiple providers of that service must be 
available in a market (i.e., competition); 
and sufficient data about the prices and 
quality of services must be available. 
Another study has estimated that only 
about one third of total health care 
spending in a given year is on services 
that are shoppable.4 Also notable is 
that consumer shopping does not have 
to be limited to comparisons across 
providers for Service X. Consumers may 
also choose to compare the cost of Ser-
vice X with the cost of Service Y or even 
choose not to receive Service X at all.  
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Analysis 
This analysis replicated the White and 
Eguchi methodology as closely as possible 
using the HCCI dataset weighted to be 
nationally representative. The HCCI study 
population comprised individuals younger 
than age 65 and covered by employer-
sponsored insurance (ESI). The analysis 
was conducted using 2011 data compara-
ble to those of White and Eguchi. Using 
their definition of “shoppable” health care 
services, we examined the total spending 
on these services. As defined by White 
and Eguchi, shoppable services are those 
that are both the highest-spending and 
could be scheduled in advance of receiv-
ing the service. That is not to say that 
shopping for each of these services would 
be practical for an individual, only that he 
or she could shop for the service. Health 
care services are divided into six general 
categories, as shown in Table 1.5 (See Data 
and Methods for more information about 
the categories of services and the meth-
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odology used in the analysis.) The num-
bers presented in this issue brief should 
be viewed as estimated upper-bound 
maximums for the amount of money that 
could be spent on shoppable and non-
shoppable services. It is important to 
note that this analysis did not incorporate 
market features (e.g., number of provid-
ers in a market, insurer concentration), 
geographic location (e.g., rural, urban, 
population), or health status (e.g., per-
centage of population with serious health 
problems).  
Total health care spending 
In 2011, total spending on all health care 
services for the national ESI population 
was estimated at $524.2 billion. Of this 
amount, we found that at most, 43% of 
total spending was on services that can 
be considered shoppable. This is in con-
trast to, and higher than, the one-third of 
spending on shoppable services found by 
White and Eguchi. One reason for this 
difference could be the study popula-
tions, as the White and Eguchi study pop-
ulation included mainly urban auto-
workers and their families, whereas the 
HCCI population was weighted to be na-
tionally representative. 
As seen in Figure 1, the largest piece of 
the spending “pie” was for shoppable 
outpatient/physician services (34% of 
total spending), followed by non-
shoppable outpatient/physician services 
(33% of total spending). This suggests 
that in 2011, more dollars were spent on 
shoppable outpatient/physician services 
than on non-shoppable outpatient/
physician services. In contrast, more was 
spent on non-shoppable inpatient ser-
vices than on shoppable inpatient ser-
vices. And hip and knee replacements, 
which are considered shoppable, add 
only an additional 1.3% to the shoppable 
inpatient services category. These dispar-
ate findings may reflect differences in the 
mix and use of services between the two 
categories: inpatient services and outpa-
tient/physician services. For example, 
there are more services that are consid-
ered shoppable among the shoppable 
outpatient/physician services than 
among the shoppable inpatient services 
category, and far more outpatient/
physician services than inpatient admis-
sions are used in a given year. Overall, 
however, more than half of the spending 
in 2011 was on services not considered 
shoppable.  
Out-of-pocket spending for health care 
For consumers—those potentially actual-
ly shopping—out-of-pocket spending 
should be more important than total 
Source: HCCI, 2016. Claims data from employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) population 
younger than age 65 for the year 2011, data weighted to be nationally representa-
tive. 
Source: HCCI, 20156 
Note: Categories of services used in the analysis are based on the schema designed by Chapin and White.. 
Table 1: Description of Categories of Services  
Shoppable Inpatient 
Admissions 
Shoppable Knee 
and Hip Replace-
ment Admissions 
Shoppable Outpa-
tient/Physician 
Services 
Non-Shoppable 
Inpatient Admis-
sions 
Non-Shoppable 
Outpatient/
Physician Services 
Prescription Drugs 
68 DRG-based ad-
missions 
5 DRG-based ad-
missions 
277 CPT or HCPCS 
codes 
Other hospital 
admissions not 
considered shop-
pable 
Other outpatient/
physician claims 
not considered 
shoppable 
Prescription drug 
and device claims 
filled through a 
pharmacy 
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spending. Out-of-pocket spending in the 
HCCI dataset is calculated as the total of 
copayments, coinsurance payments, and 
deductible payments made by consumers 
to providers for health care services. Ac-
cording to HCCI’s 2012 Health Care Cost 
and Utilization Report (using 2011 data), 
about 16% of spending on health care 
services are payments made out of pock-
et by consumers in the form of copay-
ments, coinsurance, and deductibles. In 
this analysis, of the $524.2 billion spent 
on health care in 2011, about 15%6—or 
$80.8 billion—was spent out of pocket. 
Of this amount, about 7%—or $37.7 bil-
lion—was spent out of pocket on shoppa-
ble services (Figure 2). 
Of the out-of-pocket spending, the most 
dollars were spent on shoppable outpa-
tient/physician services: around 44%. Out
-of-pocket spending on inpatient services, 
both shoppable and non-shoppable, 
makes up a very small piece of total out-
of-pocket spending, as most consumers 
spend far more money on outpatient/
physician services than on inpatient ser-
vices.  
Total out-of-pocket spending, however, is 
not the complete story. The amount of 
money consumers spend out of pocket 
on any given health service is determined 
in part by their health insurance benefit 
design. Out-of-pocket payments can be 
one of three types: coinsurance, deducti-
bles, or copayments. Though copayments 
tend to be specifically defined dollar 
amounts, coinsurance and deductible 
payments can be highly variable, depend-
ing on the insurance plan, the provider, 
and the health care services.  
For consumers hoping to save money 
through price shopping, a (relatively) 
straightforward method might be to 
choose lower-priced providers when 
shopping for services that require coin-
surance payments, as coinsurance pay-
ments often vary with the price of the 
health care service. In this analysis, about 
27% of the out-of-pocket spending for 
shoppable services was for coinsurance 
payments. These coinsurance dollars rep-
resent around 12% of all dollars spent out 
of pocket. The vast majority of the coin-
surance payments were on outpatient/
physician services; consumers spent 
about six times more for coinsurance 
payments for these shoppable services 
than for coinsurance for shoppable inpa-
tient services.  
We also might assume that consumers 
would be more likely to price-shop for 
procedures that cost more (i.e., “high-
dollar” procedures) than for procedures 
that cost less (i.e., “low-dollar” proce-
dures), as the potential savings to the 
consumer would be greater. Coinsurance 
payments by consumers on high-dollar 
outpatient/physician services7 accounted 
for about 9% of total out-of-pocket 
spending for all health care services. In 
other words, if we were to assume that 
consumers have the highest incentive to 
alter their behavior and price-shop for 
high-dollar outpatient/physician services, 
they could alter only 9% of their total out
-of-pocket spending, on average, through 
coinsurance payments.  
Deductible payments, as opposed to co-
insurance payments, may provide a 
different set of incentives for consumers. 
Consumers may want to choose low 
priced providers while in their health 
plan’s deductible. Conversely, they may 
care less about price if they believe they 
will reach their deductible. In this analy-
sis, payments for deductibles accounted 
for nearly 50% of the dollars spent out of 
pocket on shoppable services. However, 
deductible payments make up a larger 
portion of the out-of-pocket spending on 
low-dollar outpatient/physician services 
(51% of out-of-pocket spending) as com-
pared to out of pocket spending on high-
dollar outpatient/physician services (41% 
of out-of-pocket spending).  
After coinsurance and the deductible, the 
balance of the out-of-pocket spending is 
copayments. For consumers who want to 
Source: HCCI, 2016. Claims data from employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) popula-
tion younger than age 65 for the year 2011, data weighted to be nationally repre-
sentative.   
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save money on their health care services, 
price-shopping services that are mainly 
paid for by copayments (rather than 
through coinsurance or deductible pay-
ments) may not be a very effective way 
to save money. Copayments are generally 
a fixed price for a service and are set by 
the health plan: for example, a $20 flat 
fee to see an in-network primary care 
provider. One fourth of the dollars spent 
out of pocket on shoppable services were 
for copayments in 2011. Copayments 
seem to have the largest effect on low-
dollar shoppable outpatient/physician 
services, where 30% of out-of-pocket 
spending on this category of services was 
through copayments. In contrast, copay-
ments on shoppable high-dollar outpa-
tient/physician services accounted for 
only 2% of the out-of-pocket spending. 
Price variation 
For consumers to be able to influence 
their out-of-pocket payments by price-
shopping, price variation must exist in the 
market. If prices do not vary in a market, 
the availability of perfect pricing infor-
mation will not lead to lower spending, as 
consumers would find no lower-priced 
services from which to choose. This sec-
tion describes the amount of variation 
observed in the weighted data; the high-
er the coefficient of variation, the larger 
the price variation.  
We find that nationally, knee and hip 
replacement admissions had a coefficient 
of variation much lower than either inpa-
tient shoppable (excluding knee and hip 
replacements) or inpatient non-
shoppable (Table 2). In other words, na-
tionally there seems to be less price vari-
ation in the categories of shoppable ser-
vices then non-shoppable services. While 
we understand that people cannot shop 
nationally for most services, Table 1 illus-
trates general price variation across 
broad categories of services. However, 
this result is not to suggest that shopping 
for knee and hip replacements never 
makes sense. In Palm Bay, Florida, for 
example, a knee replacement costs 
$16,822 more than the same surgery 180 
miles away in Miami. 
Analysis of price variation by state reveals 
that the three states with the highest 
variation across all three categories of 
inpatient services were Kentucky, Texas, 
and Georgia (Table 3). These states had 
much more variation than the national 
average across all three categories. Two 
states near the bottom for variation in all 
three categories were Montana and Ha-
waii. These states had far less price varia-
tion that the national averages, and less 
than almost all other states. In general, 
the more populous states had greater 
price variation, while the less populous 
states had the least variation. 
The top five most frequently utilized ser-
vices were analyzed for both the shoppa-
ble and non-shoppable outpatient/
professional services categories (Table 4). 
Of all ten frequently used services identi-
fied, the most price variation was ob-
served for venipunctures—a shoppable 
service with a coefficient of variation five 
Table 2: Price Variation in Inpatient Services  
 Services 
Coefficient of Variation (lower numbers indicate less 
price variation)  
Inpatient Facility Shoppable (excludes hip/knee replacements)  2.07 
Inpatient Facility Hip/Knee  0.61 
Inpatient Facility Non-Shoppable  2.45 
Source: HCCI, 2016 
Notes: Data represents the weighted national population of insureds 0-64 covered by ESI, for the year 2011  
Table 3: Price Variation in Inpatient Services for States with Most and 
Least Variation  
 State 
Inpatient Shoppable 
Coefficient of Variation  
Inpatient Hip/Knee 
Coefficient of Variation  
Inpatient Non-Shoppable 
Coefficient of Variation  
Kentucky 2.99 1.03 3.14 
Texas 2.98 0.84 3.28 
Georgia 2.51 0.97 3.17 
Montana 0.83 0.23 1.15 
Hawaii 0.41 0.29 0.37 
Source: HCCI, 2016 
Notes: Data represents the weighted population of insureds 0-64 covered by ESI, for the year 2011  
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times larger than that for urinalysis, the 
service with the second-most observed 
price variation. Overall, the level of varia-
tion is fairly similar across categories and 
is possibly a bit higher for the shoppable 
identified services as compared to the 
non-shoppable services.  
Another frequently discussed shoppable 
procedure is colonoscopies (CPT code 
45378). The national price variation for 
colonoscopies (coefficient of variation = 
0.95) is relatively similar to that of the 
procedures displayed in Table 4. Howev-
er, as noted above, price variation also 
varies across geographies. The greatest 
price variation for colonoscopies was ob-
served for Arizona (coefficient of variation 
= 1.36); Florida (coefficient of variation = 
1.35); and Kentucky (coefficient of varia-
tion = 1.32). At the other end of the spec-
trum, the states with the least variation 
were South Dakota (coefficient of varia-
tion = 0.30); Alaska (coefficient of varia-
tion = 0.29); and Hawaii (coefficient of 
variation = 0.15). 
Discussion 
One barrier to consumer shopping is the 
presence and/or perception of transac-
tion costs, whereby the costs of shopping 
appear to be higher than the perceived 
benefits. This may apply especially to low-
er-cost services, and services with con-
sumer payments mandated by the benefit 
design (e.g., pre-set copayments for doc-
tor visits). In terms of a simple calculus: 
the benefits of shopping must exceed the 
individual’s costs associated with shop-
ping, in order to achieve the desired out-
come of price shopping. This provides two 
possible ways whereby interventions 
could encourage consumers to price-shop 
for the health care services: lowering 
costs and/or increasing benefits. 
Lowering the costs associated with shop-
ping is possible and there are many pri-
vate and public efforts made at this. For 
example, HCCI’s Guroo.com, pricing tools 
available to the members of many health 
insurers, and state efforts at building all-
payer claims databases (APCDs)—in 
states such as Vermont—and creating 
pricing Websites as in New Hampshire 
and Maine. However, even in a world 
with perfect pricing information, consum-
ers must perceive benefits to want to 
gather and then apply the information.  
While raising benefits may seem more 
difficult than lowering the costs associat-
ed with shopping, early efforts at these 
types of efforts are ongoing and may 
prove fruitful at saving money. One nota-
ble example of this is the reference-based 
pricing program implemented by Califor-
nia Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(CalPERS) for knee and hip replacements. 
Based on the implementation of this pro-
gram, procedures at lower-cost facilities 
increased while procedures at higher-cost 
facilities decreased. This reference price 
program was estimated to save the state 
of California $2.8 million and saved 
CalPERS members an additional $300,000 
in out-of-pocket costs.8 
Another idea would be a modification of 
the reference price model into a benefits-
sharing model. Once the reference price 
is set, if consumers chose providers with 
prices above the reference price, they 
would pay the difference, whereas if they 
chose a provider under the reference 
price—holding quality constant—they 
would share in the savings. An important 
note is that this type of incentive struc-
ture would require information about 
provider quality, so consumers were not 
forced to choose lower-quality care to 
save money. And, at the same time, 
standardizing quality across the health 
care system would remove quality from 
this process. Additionally, this type of 
Table 4: Price Variation in the Most Frequently Utilized Procedures for 
Shoppable and Non-Shoppable Outpatient/Professional Services 
Outpatient Shoppable  
CPT Code  Coefficient of Variation  
Outpatient Non-Shoppable  
CPT Code  Coefficient of Variation  
Established patient office visit, level 3: 
99213  0.54 
Immunization administra-
tion: 90460 0.86 
Established patient office visit, level 4: 
99214 0.51 
Chiropractic manipulative 
therapy: 98940 0.51 
Collection of venous blood through 
venipuncture: 36415 10.89 Urinalysis: 81001 2.02 
Therapeutic exercises: 97110 1.05 
E&M emergency room 
visit, moderate severity: 
99283 0.88 
Manual therapy techniques: 97140 1.08 Rapid strep test: 87880 0.80 
Source: HCCI, 2016 
Notes: Data represents the weighted national population of insureds 0-64 covered by ESI., for the year 2011  
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incentive structure could work only for 
specific health services that are shoppa-
ble; if prices are high; where consumer 
payments are not set ahead of time (i.e., 
copayments); pricing and quality infor-
mation is available; there are a sufficient 
number of providers in market from 
which to choose; and where there is a 
wide variation in the distribution of prices 
for that service within the geography.  
The limits of price transparency and 
shopping 
Some evidence suggests that greater 
price transparency and emphasis on price 
shopping by consumers might lower 
spending on health care—for states, in-
surers, employers, and consumers.3 At the 
same time, however, logistical and incen-
tive roadblocks prevent full realization of 
the goals of price transparency efforts.   
Patient limits: Some of the biggest limita-
tions in price-shopping by consumers are 
from the patients themselves. Most im-
portant, if an individual is very sick, he or 
she might not be able or willing to shop 
for services, even if the needed services 
can be defined—or utilized by others—as 
shoppable. Additionally, though some 
services might be considered shoppable, 
such as a venipuncture, shopping for that 
service might not be convenient, practi-
cal, or advisable. Many such services 
often take place at a patient’s usual care 
source (i.e., their primary care physician’s 
office) and, as such, shopping for a differ-
ent provider to provide small routine ser-
vices may present difficulties, or even 
hardships, to many. There is also a sizable 
segment of the ESI-covered population 
that is largely unengaged from the health 
care system. In any given year, roughly 
25% of HCCI’s ESI population does not 
have a health care claim (see “The per-
centage of HCCI’s ESI population that has 
no health insurance claim (2010–2014)”). 
Engaging these individuals as consumer 
price shoppers may be difficult and not 
immediately productive.  
Integrated care: An important theme 
within the Affordable Care Act was the 
development of a comprehensive and 
integrated medical records system across 
the health care system. However, nearly 4 
years out from the ACA implementation, 
this worthy goal has yet to be wholly real-
ized. Shopping for low priced health care 
services seems likely to lead to consumers 
accessing care and services from a variety 
of providers. Without an integrated rec-
ords system, health care providers will 
have a difficult time providing quality 
care. This shopping for providers also may 
be at odds with other ACA initiatives, such 
as Accountable Care Organizations 
(ACOs), whose goal is to coordinate pa-
tient care across providers.    
Prescription drugs: In this analysis, pre-
scription drugs are not considered shop-
pable services. This is not because it is 
impossible for consumers to shop for low-
er drug prices; rather, it is an open ques-
tion as to how consumers should be in-
centivized to shop for their prescriptions. 
Without an integrated data system, shop-
ping could increase the risk of drug inter-
actions.  
Benefit design: As noted above, consumer 
payments made out of pocket on health 
care services are often largely determined 
by the specific benefit design of their in-
surance plan. Some basic benefit design 
features may make consumers either 
more or less likely to price-shop, absent 
any other cost or benefit calculations. On 
one hand, for example, benefit designs 
that are heavily dominated by copay-
ments may deter consumers from price 
shopping. On the other hand, shopping 
may make the most sense for people in 
high-deductible health plans (HDHPs), as 
these consumers tend to face the highest 
(and perhaps the most variable) deducti-
ble and coinsurance costs.  
Conclusions 
The analysis presented here suggests that 
a large portion of health care spending 
every year is on services for which con-
sumers could price-shop ahead of receiv-
ing them. As much as 43% of the dollars 
spent on health care services in 2011 
The percentage of HCCI’s ESI population that has no health insurance claim (2010-2014) 
In any given year, about 25% of the population of individuals younger than age 65 and covered by ESI in HCCI’s dataset 
(unweighted) have no health care claim filed with their insurer. Though this percentage of non-utilizers has increased slightly 
over time, it has remained at around a quarter of the population in all years. 
 Year Percentage of Non-Utilizers  
2010 25.3% 
2011 24.3% 
2012 24.6% 
2013 25.1% 
2014 26.9% 
Source: HCCI, 2016 
Notes: Data represents the population of insureds 0-64 covered by ESI.. 
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were for such shoppable services. For 
consumers, shoppable services totaled 
about 47% of their portion of the health 
care bill. This is an interesting finding—
that consumers might be able to effect, 
on average, up to nearly half of their 
yearly out-of-pocket payments by price-
shopping. Given the limits of benefit de-
sign, however, altering some of this total 
may be difficult for consumers.  
The parts of out-of-pocket spending that 
might be variable, and therefore have the 
potential to be lowered through price-
shopping, are coinsurance and deductible 
payments. Coinsurance and deductible 
payments made up 75% of the out-of-
pocket spending on shoppable services in 
2011. This totaled 35% of all of the out-of
-pocket spending in that year. One take-
away from this might be that on average, 
consumers may be able to alter a third of 
their out-of-pocket health care spending 
in a given year. This could mean im-
portant savings for people with serious 
health conditions or people with high 
deductible plans. At the same time, this 
also suggests that on average, consumers 
will have difficulty altering 65% of the out
-of-pocket spending. While 46% of total 
out-of-pocket spending was on shoppa-
ble services, 53% of out-of-pocket spend-
ing was on non-shoppable services. 
Overall, we come to the conclusion that 
the potential gains from the consumer 
price shopping aspect of price transpar-
ency efforts are modest. There are those 
arguing that we need to design health 
care systems and price transparency 
tools with consumer price shopping as 
central goals. Though one important fea-
ture of properly functioning markets is 
the availability of both price and quality 
information, consumer activity driven by 
this information should not be the focus. 
Rather, we believe that delivery systems 
should be designed without consumer 
shopping at the fore and view any bene-
fits from shopping as a positive outcome. 
 
Limitations 
Our study has several limitations that can 
affect the interpretation of the findings. 
For this reason, HCCI considers its work a 
starting point for analysis and research 
on the cost of shoppable services for indi-
viduals younger than age 65 covered by 
ESI. 
Our findings are estimates for the United 
States ESI population based on a sample 
of approximately 25% of ESI insureds 
younger than age 65. The estimates for 
numbers of insured individuals by each 
plan type were weighted to account for 
any demographic differences between 
the analytic sample and population esti-
mates based on the United States Cen-
sus, making the dataset representative of 
the national, ESI population younger than 
age 65. The tables and figures presented 
are limited to descriptive statistics for 
they study population. Finally, the num-
bers presented here represent an outer-
upper bounds for potential totals of 
spending and shoppable services. Follow 
up analyses that include finer precision 
and more potential factors, such as place 
of service, could further refine these 
numbers. 
Data and Methods 
This issue brief utilized the Health Care 
Cost Institutes’ dataset of private insur-
ance health care claims. The final analytic 
dataset consisted of individuals who 
were covered by ESI for calendar year 
2011. To be included in the study popula-
tion individuals must have been younger 
than age 65 in 2011, had an identifiable 
age and gender, and a valid state, zip 
code, or core-based statistical area 
(CBSA) of residence. If an individual had 
multiple states of residence listed in 
2011, the state from the first month of 
insurance in 2011 was used. The final 
study population was weighted by age-
gender-state to be representative of the 
national population.  
Emergency room visits: The original 
methodology designed by White and 
Eguchi classified otherwise shoppable 
services (inpatient and outpatient/
physician) as non-shoppable if there was 
evidence of an emergency room (ER) visit 
within the 3 days prior to the service uti-
lization. ER visits were identified as out-
patient claims with a 23 point of service 
(POS) claim or a 450, 451, 452, 456, or 
459 revenue code.  
Outpatient/physician services: Outpa-
tient and physician claims were com-
bined and then divided into shoppable 
and non-shoppable services by the CPT 
or HCPCS code on the claim (see outpa-
tient/physician shoppable CPT and HCPCS 
codes). Claim lines were removed from 
the sample if there were null vales for 
the procedure code, and all three diagno-
sis codes.  
Inpatient admissions: To create an inpa-
tient admission, all inpatient claim lines 
with the same patient identification num-
ber, admit identification number, and 
first admission date were combined. The 
three categories of inpatient admissions 
(shoppable inpatient admissions – ex-
cluding knee and hip replacements; shop-
pable knee and hip replacements; non-
shoppable inpatient admissions) were 
classified by the diagnosis-related group 
(DRG) for each admission (see all shoppa-
ble inpatient admissions DRGs). If any 
claim line in an admission had a DRG 
from the list of shoppable DRGs, admis-
sion was considered shoppable. If an ad-
mission had DRGs from both the shoppa-
ble inpatient and shoppable knee and hip 
replacement lists then the following rules 
were applied. 1) If the DRG was 945, 462, 
8 www.healthcostinstitute.org 
494, or 491, then the admission was con-
sidered a shoppable knee and hip re-
placement. 2) If the DRG was any other 
from the shoppable admissions list, than 
the admission was classified by the DRG 
with the earliest claim date. If the total 
allowed amount of an admission 
summed to less than $50, the average 
allowed amount for the whole category 
was substituted for the less than $50 
amount. Several rules were also applied 
to limit outlier admissions. Admissions 
were removed from the sample if:  
 The length of stay was greater than 180 
days or less than 1 day;   
 The allowed amount on the admission 
summed to less than or equal to zero 
dollars; 
 All claim lines for the admission had a 
null DRG or null major diagnostic cate-
gory (MDC). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Endnotes 
1. Muir MA, Alessi SA, King JS. “Clarifying 
Costs: Can Increased Price Transpar-
ency Reduce Healthcare Spending?” 
William & Mary Policy Review 4 
(2013): 319-–366. Web.  
2. Congressional Budget Office. 
“Increasing Transparency in the Pric-
ing of Health Care Services and Phar-
maceuticals.” CBO.gov. Web. 2008.  
3. White C, Ginsburg PB, Tu HT, Reschov-
sky JD et al. Healthcare Price Trans-
parency: Policy Approaches and Esti-
mated Impacts on Spending. West 
Health Policy Center. Web. May 2014.  
4. White C, Eguchi M. Reference Pricing: 
A Small Piece of the Health Care Price 
and Quality Puzzle. National Institute 
for Health Care Reform Research Brief 
Number 18. Web. October 2014.  
5. For a full list of DRG and CPT/HCPCS 
used to categorize services, see the 
online appendix of White and Eguchi. 
6. Differences between these two num-
bers are likely due to small differences 
in study populations and population 
weighting techniques. 
7. High dollar outpatient/physician ser-
vices are defined here as services 
whose average price is two standard 
deviations above the mean price for 
the whole category. For shoppable 
outpatient/physician services this is 
an average price of about $1,000. 
8. Robinson JC, Brown TT. “Increases in 
Consumer Cost Sharing Redirect Pa-
tient Volumes and Reduce Hospital 
Prices for Orthopedic Surgery.” Health 
Affairs 32.8 (2013): 1392-1397 
Authors     
Amanda Frost, David Newman 
Contact  
Amanda Frost  
Health Care Cost Institute, Inc. 
1100 G Street NW, Suite 600 
Washington, DC 20005 
202-803-5200 
 
This HCCI research product originated in response to sugges-
tions by an independent third party. The authors retained 
control over all methods, content, and dissemination of the 
results. 
Copyright 2016 
Health Care Cost Institute, Inc. 
Unless explicitly noted, the content of this report is licensed 
under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No 
Derivatives 4.0 International License 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements  
The authors would like to acknowledge and thank Lynn 
Quincy and Chapin White for their assistance in the develop-
ment of this issue brief. 
